Αποκαλυπτικά είναι τα όσα μπορεί κανείς να διαβάσει από τα WikiLeaks σχετικά με το σκοπιανό και τα όσα έλεγαν οι Αμερικανοί.
Αυτό που μπορεί κανείς να καταλάβει είναι ότι οι Σκοπιανοί σήμερα έχουν πετύχει τους στόχους που ο ίδιος ο Γκρούεφσκι είχε θέσει, δηλαδή αναγνώριση της εθνότητος και της γλώσσας (τα πιο σημαντικά δηλαδή).
Ο Νίκος Κοτζιάς λέει συνεχώς ότι το κύριο πρόβλημα για τη συμφωνία ήταν το ακροδεξιό VMRO το οποίο αφού έφυγε και ήρθε ο Ζάεφ μπορούσε επιτέλους να επιλυθεί.
Όμως οι ΣΥΡΙΖΑίοι στην πραγματικότητα έδωσαν ότι ζητούσαν οι εθνικιστές των Σκοπίων, λέγοντας για άλλη μια φορά στον ελληνικό λαό ψέματα.
Δείτε παρακάτω τα αποκαλυπτικά έγγραφα των WikiLeaks για τα όσα έλεγαν οι Αμερικανοί το 2008:
Classified By: DCM THOMAS J. NAVRATIL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
Elements of a Deal
1. (C) Embassy Skopje assesses that in the context of an
agreement that clears the way for NATO membership and the
start of EU accession talks, the Macedonian government would
ultimately accept the following terms:
— Name: Republic of Northern Macedonia (or: Republic of
— Scope: in all international organizations, plus
bilaterally by any country that does not want to use the
constitutional name. (Although we have not discussed this
explicitly, presumably international agreements would follow
the same pattern, with multilateral ones using the new name
and bilateral ones having the option.) Macedonia would use
its constitutional name in referring to itself, on passports,
product labels, in the media, etc.
— Identity: The language and nationality would be called
Macedonian, but this could be handled tacitly, perhaps as a
subsequent annex to a UNSCR, or in some other internal UN
document not subject to Greek review/approval. Bottom line
is Macedonia needs assurance that their language,
nationality, etc. would continue to be called Macedonian, not
2. (C) Today PM Gruevski would take exception to several
aspects of this package. He wants the modifier to be in
parentheses; he wants recognition of Macedonian language and
nationality to be explicit rather than tacit. On scope, he
would want to limit usage to IOs in which FYROM is already
used. For bilateral use, he would want the UN merely to
authorize, rather than encourage or recommend, use of the new
name. Similarly, he would seek to limit use of the new name
on international agreements. Nevertheless, we anticipate
that he would in the end decide to give ground on these
issues if it got him the deal. In any case, he has made
holding a national referendum part of his governing platform
and he will insist on fulfilling that prominent public
pledge. An agreement in September would allow time for this
referendum and passage of a UNSCR prior to the December NAC.
3. (C) Conversations with Prime Minister Gruevski and
President Crvenkovski, summarized below, underlie Embassy
Skopje,s assessment. This cable, together with Athens 1030,
illuminates the substantial gaps between the Macedonian and
Greek positions at this time.
Amb. Milovanovic ) PM Gruevski July 25
4. (C) After discussing concerns about Macedonian
developments that may affect NATO perceptions of Macedonia’s
readiness (election problems, Parliament problems,
spectacular arrests, budget rebalance away from MoD), the
Ambassador urged that Macedonia take action to ensure that it
not only does not slip below NATO criteria, but that it keep
up as NATO continues to move ahead. Gruevski asked in turn
if we can solve the name issue. The Ambassador replied that
we are prepared to help Macedonia on this, and that we are
urging that the negotiations focus solely on the key areas of
the name and the usage, without inclusion of other bilateral
5. (C) Gruevski expressed his view that Greece is determined
not to solve this issue, and therefore he decided to open
other issues (i.e., ethnic Macedonians in Greece). The
Ambassador urged that Macedonia exert maximum efforts to find
a solution. Gruevski welcomed the next round of talks with
Amb. Nimetz in mid-August, and is prepared to accept
Nimetz,s invitation for a meeting among Gruevski,
Karamanlis, and Sec. Rice if the August talks go well and
produce progress toward a solution.
A/S Hill ) PM Gruevski July 26
6. (C) A/S Hill asked about lines of communication with
Greece, and Gruevski mentioned only the UN process. Gruevski
shared his assessment that the Greek side does not have the
SKOPJE 00000491 002 OF 003
intention to solve the problem. He noted upcoming elections
in Greece (early Parliamentary elections sometime between
October and April (note: Emb. Athens sees early elections as
very unlikely), local elections in April, and European
parliamentary elections in June) and cited Greek press
reports as indicating lack of intention to solve. Gruevski
argued that Karamanlis, position has hardened since last
October. No longer seeking just to find a new name to
replace FYROM, Karamanlis now seeks to broaden the scope to
all usages, and limit the Macedonian identity, history, use
of toponyms. Gruevski said he is willing to solve this,
based on real, reasonable redlines. Hill said he needs to
make sure the Macedonian people don’t become frustrated and
have a nationalist reaction. Gruevski said this is already
happening in Greece.
7. (C) Gruevski cited a recent poll that VMRO commissioned
which he said showed that only 13 percent of Macedonians
would accept the name Republic of North Macedonia.
Nevertheless, if there were a proposal to use a name like
that, with the new modifier in parentheses, to be used
wherever FYROM is now, and recognition that the nationality
and language would be called Macedonian, Gruevski expressed
confidence that the public would support it in a referendum.
He said that he would support it, he would expect President
Crvenkovski, the international community, and the media to
support it, and that with a two-month campaign the public
Amb. Milovanovic, A/S Hill ) Pres. Crvenkovski July 27
8. (C) Crvenkovski said that the current situation with name
issue is blocked and he is concerned that this could go from
a temporary situation to become permanent. Everyone
including the international community is getting used to the
situation, which contributes to the threat of it being long
lasting/permanent. He is pessimistic for two reasons:
Karamanlis and Gruevski.
9. (C) Crvenkovski thinks Greece could agree to Northern
Macedonia. Hill asked about Macedonian identity and
language. Crvenkovski said a possible way out is the Greek
position that discussion is on the name of the country, and
nationality and language are not part of the talks.
Crvenkovski sees as a possible solution that only the name
and its scope of use are in the bilateral talks with Greece
and in the bilateral agreement Greece would sign. Macedonia
needs to keep Macedonian as its language and
nationality/identity but this could be in the UNSCR only (as
an appendix), not in something Greece has to sign or sign
onto, thus saving face for Greece and making agreement on
name and scope possible. Crvenkovski says Nimetz understands
10. (C) Crvenkovski thinks Republic of (Northern) Macedonia
with a scope of using this wherever FYROM is used would work.
Says the scope strikes him as the most problematic element.
Pre-Bucharest proposal that Macedonia accepted recommended
that nations consider using (or recommended that they use)
the agreed name in bilateral relations instead of the
constitutional name, but the most recent Nimetz proposal went
to requiring bilateral international use and this is too
much. Also too much is any formula that requires Macedonia
to call itself something other than Republic of Macedonia,
for example on passports or products. It is one thing to
discuss how others call Macedonia, and under what
circumstances, but quite another beyond the scope of the
discussions or of the possible/reasonable to talk in terms of
dictating that Macedonia call itself something other than its
11. (C) Crvenkovski said that Greece,s tactic is to provoke,
change goal posts, and prolong negotiations. But this is no
reason for Macedonia (PM Gruevski) to adopt the same tactics
(e.g. adding the Aegean Macedonian issue to the pot).
Macedonia needs a quick resolution and Greece does not so why
would they have the same tactics of obstructionism and delay?
But PM Gruevski is adopting exactly that delaying tactic.
12. (C) Crvenkovski is concerned that with Albania and
Croatia en route to NATO/EU and Serbia also, with an OK
government and Karadzic arrested, this means Macedonia is in
serious danger of winding up among the last of the Balkans to
get into NATO and EU (with Bosnia and Kosovo), which is very
SKOPJE 00000491 003 OF 003
13. (C) Crvenkovski also commented that he does not see any
regional issue (now that Kosovo is independent and Serbia is
moving in the right direction) that will attract the
attention of Brussels and Washington to focus on Macedonia.
The window of opportunity is closing fast.
14. (C) Crvenkovski is also concerned that even in the
unlikely event Karamanlis accepts a reasonable proposal on
the name (1) Gruevski will run away from responsibility for
concluding the deal and (2) if unsuccessful in avoiding
responsibility will go to referendum WITHOUT recommending a
yes vote to the public. Result of a referendum would be
helped by multi party support in Macedonia but really depends
on the question. They will get &yes8 if the question is
“do you want us to enter NATO and start negotiations with EU
under the name of Republic of (Northern) MK?” It will fail
if the question is &do you want us to surrender our
constitutional name in favor of…” (3) Gruevski does not see
EU and NATO as a sufficiently high priority to risk
supporting a decision or a referendum yes.
15. (C) Crvenkovski commented that the issue of compensation
for Aegean Macedonians and the issue of harassment at the
Greek border and denial of entry for these people will only
be solved when the name issue is solved and Macedonia is in
the EU. Because then Greek shenanigans will be contrary to
EU law of which Macedonia is a part. So although Gruevski
trots out the Aegean Macedonians as a nationalistic reason to
oppose the Greeks, in practice the way to really solve those
people,s problems is to compromise with the Greeks (assuming
Karamalis will accept a decent compromise).
16. (C) Crvenkovski strongly suggested a big push by the U.S.
in time for the Nimetz proposal/visit in mid August. He
suggested that the proposal fit on one page and only address
the name (Republic of Northern Macedonia) and scope (use
wherever FYROM is now used) and be a &take it or leave it8
offer. This could perhaps be concluded on the margins of
UNGA. UNSCR would include annex specifying language
Macedonian and nationality Macedonian, and Crvenkovski is
convinced Greeks will accept this if not asked directly to do
so or asked to sign onto it. Just let it be part of UNSCR